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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

BEAN V. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE: A
COMMITTED PERSON PETITIONING FOR RELEASE FROM
CONFINEMENT IS NOT REQUIRED TO PRODUCE EXPERT
MEDICAL TESTIMONY TO MEET THE EVIDENTIARY
BURDEN.
By: Megan Ellenson
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that when a committed
person petitions for release, he or she does not have to produce expert
medical testimony to satisfy the evidentiary burden that he or she
would not pose a danger if released. Bean v. Dep 't of Health &
Mental Hygiene, 406 Md. 419, 959 A.2d 778 (2008). Rather, the court
found that the requirement of expert testimony depends on the facts
and circumstances in dispute and will be looked at on a case-by-case
basis. !d. at 440-41, 959 A.2d at 791.
On December 3, 1985, Linwood Bean ("Bean") was committed to
the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene ("Department") for
inpatient treatment after being found not criminally responsible for
assault with intent to murder. Bean was conditionally released from
his commitment on three separate occasions. On October 15, 2001,
his most recent release was revoked due to allegations of assault.
On December 23, 2004, Bean filed a petition for release in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City pursuant to Section 3-119 of the
Maryland Code's Criminal Procedure Article. A jury trial was held to
determine if Bean was eligible for release. During the trial, Bean's
only two witnesses were himself and his friend, Andrew Conwell
("Conwell"), neither of whom were offered as experts. During
testimony, both Bean and Conwell acknowledged that Bean had
schizophrenia; however, both noted that Bean would not be a danger
to himself or others if he was released. Specifically, Bean testified
that he would continue to take his required medication upon release.
The Department produced expert testimony from Lisa Sloat, M.D.,
explaining that due to Bean's schizophrenia, he would pose a danger
to himself and others if released. The case was submitted to the jury,
who returned a verdict in favor of Bean's conditional release. The
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Department filed a Motion to Stay Pending Appeal and an Application
for Leave to Appeal with the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland granted the Department's
motion and reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that a
defendant who is committed must produce expert medical testimony to
meet his burden of proof in proceedings determining eligibility for
release. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted Bean's petition for
a writ of certiorari.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis with an
examination of the language of Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure
Article of the Maryland Code. Bean, 406 Md. at 429, 959 A.2d at 784.
The Court focused on Sections 3-101 through 3-123, which concern a
person's mental capacity. !d. at 431, 959 A.2d at 785. The court
found that Title 3 does not require courts to receive and consider
expert testimony when determining a person's mental capacity. !d. at
431-32, 959 A.2d at 785.
This includes release eligibility
determinations. !d.
The burden is on the committed person to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is eligible for release. !d. at
429, 959 A.2d at 784 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-114(d)
(West 2006)). This entails providing evidence to show that he will not
be a danger to himself or others if released. Bean, 406 Md. at 429,
959 A.2d at 784 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-114(c)
(West 2006)). The court found that based on the statute's language,
the legislature left the necessity for expert testimony to be determined
on a case-by-case basis. Bean, 406 Md. at 432, 959 A.2d at 785.
Based on the facts at issue in this case, the court determined that the
material issue for the jury to decide was the factual dispute over
whether Bean would continue to take the required medications if he
was granted a conditional release. !d. at 432, 959 A.2d at 786. The
court further stated that according to Maryland case law, expert
testimony is required in a jury trial only when the issue to be
determined is so intricately related to a certain profession that it is
beyond the scope of knowledge that an average lay person possesses.
!d. (citing CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Cos. v. Zeitler, 126 Md. App. 444,
463, 703 A.2d 248, 259-60 (1999)). The court found that Bean did not
need to present expert medical testimony on his behalf because the
facts in dispute did not involve a complex medical issue. Bean, 406
Md. at 432-33, 959 A.2d at 786. Instead, the issue involved disputed
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facts that were dependent on assessing the credibility of Bean, and this
was something an average lay person was capable of determining. !d.
The Department argued that determining whether a person with a
mental disorder is dangerous always involves complex medical issues.
I d. at 434, 959 A.2d at 787. Therefore, expert testimony is required.
!d. The court quickly dismissed this argument, noting that the
dangerousness issue does not always present itself as a complex
medical question requiring expert testimony. ld. Instead, the
necessity of expert testimony depends "on the nature of the disputed
issues." ld.
The intermediate appellate court, in holding that a person must
provide expert medical testimony to prevail in a release proceeding,
relied on a previous opinion from the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Id. at 434-35, 959 A.2d at 787 (citing Jewel Tea Co. v. Blamble, 227
Md. 1, 174 A.2d 764 (1961)). The Court of Appeals of Maryland
noted, however, that the intermediate court erred in two aspects.
Bean, 406 Md. at 435, 959 A.2d at 787. First, the proposition relied
on by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland to support its holding
was not applied to the issue in the case from which the proposition
was taken. Id. (citing Jewel Tea Co., 227 Md. at 7, 174 A.2d at 767).
Second, numerous jurisdictions, including Maryland, have found that
the dangerousness a committed person may pose if released does not
fall into the category of complex medical questions that can only be
resolved by "dueling" expert testimony. Bean, 406 Md. at 435, 959
A.2d at 787. The court further explained that its holding in Jewel Tea
Co. was not based on the fact that the expert and lay opinions
conflicted, but, rather, on the fact that the plaintiffs testimony was
grounded in speculation and possibilities. Id. at 436, 959 A.2d at 788
(citing Jewel Tea Co., 227 Md. at 8, 174 A.2d at 768). Therefore, the
court, here, refused to hold that the dangerousness posed by a
committed person always constitutes a complex medical issue
requiring expert testimony because such a holding would contradict
Maryland and federal case law. Bean, 406 Md. at 437, 959 A.2d at
788.
Finally, the court addressed a United States Supreme Court case
introduced by both parties' briefs. Bean, 406 Md. at 438-39, 959 A.2d
at 789-90 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)). In
Barefoot, the petitioner argued that psychiatrists, in a capital
sentencing proceeding, could not reliably predict the dangers posed by
a person. Bean, 406 Md. at 438-39, 959 A.2d at 789-90 (citing
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Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896). The Supreme Court found that while
expert testimony was not required, it could be helpful and relevant to
the disputed issue. Bean, 406 Md. at 439, 959 A.2d at 790 (citing
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 897-99). The Court of Appeals of Maryland
determined that Barefoot supported its holding that expert testimony
was not required in Bean's proceeding. Bean, 406 Md. at 440-41, 959
A.2d at 791. However, the court stressed that expert testimony could
be helpful in release proceedings when used on a case-by-case basis.
!d.

In Bean, the Court of Appeals of Maryland plainly stated that while
expert medical testimony is not required, it can play an important role
in release eligibility proceedings. As a result, the court gives a strong
indicator to those involved in these proceedings that while it is not
necessary for either party to retain the services of an expert, doing so
could be quite helpful to their case. The use of expert testimony will
strengthen a party's argument by providing supporting medical
expertise. It will also be helpful because the expert medical testimony
will more than likely be used by the jury to determine whether a
person poses a danger to himself and others if released.

